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INTRODUCTION
The "organizing principle"' of the American law of gratuitous transfers, as
formulated in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers, is that "the donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent
* Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University. I serve as a Uniform
Law Commissioner and was a member of the drafting committees for the two acts discussed
in this Essay - the Uniform Trust Code (2000) and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
(1994). For the latter, I was the reporter. I have also participated in the two Restatement
projects discussed here, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers (associate reporter); and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (advisor). I emphasize
that the views expressed in this Essay are not offered on behalf of the Uniform Law
Commission or the American Law Institute.
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a
(2003).
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allowed by law." 2 For transfers in trust, one corollary of this principle of
deference to transferor's intent 3 has been the understanding that most trust law
consists of default law, rules that the transferor (commonly called the "settlor"
in trust parlance) can alter when creating the trust.4 Nevertheless, trust law's
deference to the settlor's wishes has limits, reflected in the rules of mandatory
law that the settlor is not permitted to abridge.5
Among these long-established mandatory rules is the rule against capricious
purposes. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that "it is capricious to
provide that money shall be thrown into the sea, that a field shall be sowed
with salt, that a house shall be boarded up and remain unoccupied, or that a
wasteful undertaking or activity shall be continued." 6  The rationale for
refusing to enforce such terms, the Restatement says, is that they "would divert
distributions or administration from the interests of the beneficiaries.' 7 There
is a well-known case law, sadly entertaining but fortunately small, in which the
courts have struck or refused to enforce such eccentric directions in wills or
trusts.
8
2 Id. § 10.1.
"A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust
relationship." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 (2003).
4 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428 (2006 & Supp. 2009)
("Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this [Code] governs the duties and
powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary.").
I have elsewhere emphasized that the settlor/trustee relationship that is created in a
conventional private trust agreement resembles the relations of the parties to a contract,
because of the consensual character of trusteeship (the trustee must agree to serve) and the
default character of the rules governing most trust terms. See John H. Langbein, The
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627, 650 (1995) [hereinafter
Langbein, Contractarian Basis].
5 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b), 7C U.L.A. 428-29.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (2003).
7 Id. § 29(c) cmt. m (emphasis added); accord id. § 47 cmt. e; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 124 (1959).
8 E.g., Bd. of Comm'rs v. Scott (In re Scott's Will), 93 N.W. 109, 110 (Minn. 1903)
(voiding a testamentary direction to destroy money); Brown v. Burdett, (1882) 21 Ch. D.
667, 668, 673 (Eng.) (invalidating trust in which settlor ordered her house bricked up);
Aitken's Trs. v. Aitken, 1927 S.C. (H.L.) 374, 374 (Sess.) (Scot.) (refusing to enforce trust
to erect bronze equestrian statues of testator); M'Caig v. Univ. of Glasgow, 1907 S.C.
(H.L.) 231, 231 (Sess.) (Scot.) (invalidating trust to erect statues of the testator and other
family members on lands devised by the testator). Courts sometimes rest the result in such
cases on other grounds, such as nuisance or enforcement of a restrictive covenant. E.g.,
Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (refusing to enforce
direction to raze house worth $40,000, on suit of neighboring owners). Case law is
collected and discussed in 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScOTr, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER &
MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 9.3.13, at 516-18 (5th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter SCOTT & ASCHER, TRUSTS].
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In recent years, the two most authoritative sources of American trust law -
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts9 and the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC" or the
"Code") 10 - have revised the rule against capricious purposes to clarify the
principle that has always been its rationale. The Restatement version provides
that "a private trust, its terms, and its administration must be for the benefit of
its beneficiaries."' The UTC codifies the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard,
requiring that "[a] trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries."' 12
In the December 2008 issue of the Boston University Law Review, Jeffrey
Cooper published an article' 3 in which he criticized both the benefit-the-
beneficiaries standard and an article of mine, published in 2004,14 discussing
that standard.' 5 My article suggested that the clarification of the rule against
capricious purposes found in the Restatement and the UTC would have a
salutary effect in one corner of trust investment law, by limiting the power of a
trust settlor to insist that the trustee follow investment practices that are
demonstrably harmful to the interests of the beneficiaries. 16 Cooper's article
sounds a contrary theme of extreme deference to settlor power. He contends
that trust law has allowed the settlor "nearly unfettered latitude"' 7 over the
terms of the trust, and that trust law should "provide no aid in cases where a
settlor intentionally and thoughtfully impaired beneficiaries' economic
rights."18
I The American Law Institute published Volumes I and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts in 2003 and Volume 3 in 2007. A projected final volume is in preparation. The
reporter (principal drafter) is Edward C. Halbach, Jr., a distinguished scholar of trust law,
who is dean and professor emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law.
10 The Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Code in 2000 and has occasionally
amended it since. As of 2009, the UTC had been enacted in twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia. UNIF. TRUST CODE tbl., 7C U.L.A. 70 (Supp. 2009).
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) (2003).
12 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404, 7C U.L.A. 484. Although the UTC was promulgated in
2000, before the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 (2003), UTC § 404 was based upon
a preliminary draft of the Restatement provision. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt., 7C
U.L.A. 484-85. The UTC identifies the benefit-the-beneficiaries requirement as a rule of
mandatory law. Id. § 105(b)(2)-(3), 7C U.L.A. 428.
13 Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor's Intent, The Uniform Trust Code, and the
Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165 (2008).
" John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1105,
1107-19 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules], expanding on an earlier article,
John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81
IOWA L. REV. 641, 663-65 (1996) [hereinafter Langbein, Trust Investing].
15 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1169-70, 1173-77, 1192-93, 1214.
16 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1107-19.
17 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1168.
18 Id. at 1166.
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The present Essay responds to Cooper. Part I examines the balance that
trust law strikes between implementing the settlor's donative intent and
protecting the interests of trust beneficiaries in the transferred property. Part H
probes Cooper's claims that trust law should not prevent a settlor from
requiring trust assets to be invested in a fashion manifestly harmful to the
interests of the trust's beneficiaries.
I. BENEFIT THE BENEFICIARIES
A. The Dead Hand
The rule against capricious purposes is an anti-dead-hand rule, which
prevents the owner of property from doing by trust or by will something that
the owner is free to do with his or her property while alive. Some years ago,
Gareth Jones illustrated this point with an arresting example: "A settlor may
destroy his own Rembrandt. But he cannot establish a trust and order his
trustees to destroy it." 19 What explains this differing treatment of living and
deceased transferors? One justification for reduced deference to the deceased
transferor is that once in the grave, a decedent cannot reconsider a foolish
course of conduct as its consequences emerge, or as circumstances change.20
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts remarks: "[T]he 'rigor mortis' of deadhand
control is not present while a property owner is able to respond to persuasion
and evolving circumstances."'2' In a similar vein, Adam Hirsch and William
Wang have pointed out that "the interpersonal costs that living persons pay for
eccentric behavior, '22 that is, the resentments that would be provoked among
family members and other affected persons, restrain such conduct. 23 The
requirement that a transferor must have transactional capacity also limits
eccentric behavior among the living, in the sense "that an owner with capacity
19 Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY 119, 126 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). Regarding the question of public or
cultural protections of such privately owned property, see generally JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING
DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999).
20 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.3, at 544-46 (7th ed.
2007) (expressing concern with "[u]nforeseen contingencies that materialize[] after the
testator's death").
2' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) cmt. i (2003).
22 Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 13 (1992). Robert Sitkoff has remarked "that the owner's failure to destroy the
Rembrandt during his lifetime may belie a sense of ambivalence or irresolution about
ordering its destruction." Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1110, n.34 (citing
Letter from Robert Sitkoff to author 2-3 (May 27, 2003)). "By requiring that the settlor
destroy the painting during [his] lifetime if at all, the rule forces him to experience its
destruction and thus to demonstrate his resolution." Id. These and other factors are
discussed in Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
23 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 22, at 13.
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to conduct his own affairs may destroy his Rembrandt, but destroying
Rembrandts would be likely to cause capacity to be questioned. '24
B. Equitable Title
A quite distinct explanation for why the law restricts the unilateral dominion
of the settlor of a trust who is deceased (or who, though living, has transferred
the property to an irrevocable trust) is that trust law is also concerned with
protecting the ownership interests of the beneficiaries. A trust is, by definition,
a relationship in which the trustee holds and manages the trust property for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. 25 Indeed, the settlor's interest in the transferred
trust property is so evanescent that trust law denies the settlor standing to
enforce the trust (unless the settlor has retained a beneficial interest such as a
life estate, in which case the settlor's standing derives from and is limited to
that beneficial interest, distinct from capacity as settlor). 26 Property still owned
by an intending transferor is his or hers alone, but property transferred to a
trustee in trust is held by the trustee under a fiduciary obligation for the
beneficiaries of the trust.27 This ownership interest of the beneficiaries is
commonly expressed as "equitable title, '28 and that entitlement sets outer
limits on trust law's willingness to enforce settlor-imposed terms that are
harmful to the beneficiaries. 29 As David Hayton has written, these "limits to
the free will of the settlor" arise from "the irreducible core content of
trusteeship of property. '30 The Uniform Trust Code requires as a rule of
24 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1110, n.31. Regarding the capacity
requirement for a valid trust, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 (2003); for the
capacity requirement for gratuitous transfers generally, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (2003).
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) ("A trust ... is a fiduciary relationship
with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship
and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the
benefit of ... one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee.").
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b (1959). I have criticized this rule for
failing to recognize that the settlor as well as the beneficiary may have an interest in
enforcing trust terms. Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 4, at 664. The UTC
abridges the rule for charitable trusts. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended 2005), 7C
U.L.A. 486 (2006); id. § 706(a), 7C U.L.A. 575; see also id. § 411(a), 7C U.L.A. 497-98
(providing that settlor and beneficiaries may jointly compel termination of a trust "even if
the modification or termination is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust").
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
28 E.g., id. § 2 cmt. d; id. § 40 cmt. b.
29 Trust law "reflect[s] a compromise" in which the settlor's donative freedom is
"balanced against.., the effects of deadhand control on the subsequent conduct or personal
freedoms of others." Id. § 29(c) cmt. i.
30 David Hayton, The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS IN
CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 47, 48-49 (A.J. Oakley ed. 1996). Hayton's observation about
the "irreducible core" of trusteeship was echoed shortly thereafter in an opinion by Lord
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mandatory law that a trust must create enforceable duties, 31 and the Code's
official comment provides that "a settlor may not so negate the responsibilities
of a trustee that the trustee would no longer be acting in a fiduciary capacity. 32
In the leading American case of Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown,33 the
Connecticut Supreme Court sounded this rationale of beneficial entitlement,
invalidating value-impairing restrictions that the settlor attempted to impose
upon the development of commercial real estate that he left in trust. 34 The
court explained that "the restrictions are opposed to the interests of the
beneficiaries of the trust. '
35
In an insightful turn of phrase, Bernard Rudden has characterized "the
normal private trust" as "essentially a gift, projected on the plane of time and
so subjected to a management regime. '36 A transferor wishing to make a gift
need not use the trust form. A transferor who chooses to use the trust form,
however, must accept that minimum regime of fiduciary obligation that defines
a trust.37 Thus, Gareth Jones's paradox that the transferor may destroy his own
Rembrandt but not require trustees to do it.38
C. Material Purpose
There is an inherent tension in the trust relationship between deferring to
settlor's intent and enforcing the beneficiaries' equitable title. English trust
law is markedly more restrictive of settlor interference with beneficial title than
Justice Millet: "There is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustee to the
beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is fundamental to the concept of a trust. If the
beneficiaries have no rights enforceable against the trustees there are no trusts." Armitage
v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241, 253 (App. Ct. 1997) (Eng.).
31 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(4), 7C U.L.A. 481 ("A trust is created only if ... the
trustee has duties to perform."); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). To
the same effect is the rule that merger of legal and equitable estates defeats a trust. UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 402(a)(5), 7C U.L.A. 481.
32 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(1) cmt., 7C U.L.A. 429-30.
33 135 A. 555 (Conn. 1926).
14 Id. at 564.
35 Id.
36 Bernard Rudden, Book Review, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610 (1981).
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). Under the UTC, a revocable inter vivos
trust, which functions as a will substitute rather than as an inter vivos transfer, imposes no
fiduciary obligation to beneficiaries other than the settlor during the lifetime of the settlor.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a), 7C U.L.A. 553 ("While a trust is revocable [and the settlor has
capacity to revoke the trust], rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the
duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor."); accord, RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 25 (2003).
38 See Jones, supra note 19, at 126.
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American law. The classic English case of Saunders v. Vautier39 held that a
trust settlor may not impose a condition of postponed enjoyment on an adult
beneficiary's interest in trust.40 In that case, the chancery court refused to
enforce a trust term requiring that the trust income accumulate until the
beneficiary reached age twenty-five, holding instead that the beneficiary was
entitled to have the proceeds when he turned twenty-one (the then age of
majority). 41  The court reasoned that because the beneficiary alone had
equitable title, the settlor could not impose trust terms interfering with the
beneficiary's ownership interest. 42
American trust law, under the leadership of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court43 in the case of Claflin v. Claflin,44 rejected the rule in Saunders
v. Vautier in favor of what has come to be known as the material purpose
doctrine.45 Under the Claflin rule, American courts enforce a settlor-imposed
trust term so long as the court concludes that the term in question serves "a
material purpose of the trust. '46 Explaining the decision in Claflin, the
Massachusetts court emphasized the settlor's purpose in imposing the
condition of postponed enjoyment: "[T]here is not the same danger that [the
beneficiary] will spend the property while it is in the hands of the trustees as
there would be if it were in his own. '47 The logic of the American material
purpose rule is, therefore, protective. Our courts enforce settlor-imposed
restraints in circumstances in which the purpose of the restraint is to benefit the
beneficiary. Speaking of the trust modification rule, which permits a court to
alter a trust term unless the term embodies a material purpose, the Restatement
says: "Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a
purpose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or objective
'9 Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (Ch.) (1841). For a recent defense of Saunders v.
Vautier, see Paul Matthews, The Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders v.
Vautier, 122 LAW Q. REV. 266, 293-94 (2006).
40 41 Eng. Rep. at 485.
41 Id.
42 id.
13 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court exerted enormous influence on American
trust law in the nineteenth century, pioneering not only the material purpose doctrine, but
also the prudence standard for trust investing, see Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9
Pick.) 446, 460-61 (1830); the enforcement of spendthrift trusts, see Broadway Nat'l Bank
v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 174 (1882); and the so-called "Massachusetts Rule" for the
treatment of corporate dividends in trust accounting, see Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542,
552 (1869).
44 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
45 Id. at 456.
46 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 498 (2006); accord,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003).
47 Claflin, 20 N.E. at 456.
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on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to a beneficiary's
management skills, judgment, or level of maturity." 48
What then of a trust for Barbara, the beneficiary, with instructions to the
trustee to burn the trust-owned Rembrandt? That term is quite "material" in
the sense of being consequential to Barbara, but not in the sense that the
material purpose doctrine comprehends. Under the material purpose doctrine,
the court asks whether a disputed trust term has a purpose that is material to the
best interests of the beneficiaries of that trust. Trust law rightly presupposes
that in making a gift in trust rather than as an unconditioned transfer, and in
specifying the trust's terms, the settlor is highly likely to be acting for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. The trust form is commonly chosen for purposes
that are protective: to obtain professional investment management, 49 to
postpone enjoyment until the beneficiaries are more mature, to shield potential
spendthrifts by restraining their powers of alienation, 50 to divide beneficial
interests among multiple and sometimes successive descendants, and so forth.
If the settlor cares enough for particular persons to choose them as the
beneficiaries of the trust, the inference is strong that the settlor has their
interests at heart when tailoring the trust terms. On the other hand, as the
capricious purpose cases show, 5' that inference is not always correct. The
settlor who directs that the house be razed or bricked up or that the money be
buMt 52 is manifestly not acting in the interests of the beneficiaries, and that is
the reason why trust law will not enforce the settlor's direction.
The principle of deference to the donative freedom of the settlor in selecting
those persons who will be the beneficiaries of the trust is, just as Cooper says,
"nearly unfettered. '53  In a private trust, no objective standard such as
"material purpose" intrudes on the settlor's decision to prefer Barbara over
Brutus. 54 If the settlor chooses to exercise that freedom by making a transfer in
trust, the settlor has chosen to impress the property with fiduciary obligation
for the beneficiary, and the rule against capricious purposes protects against
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d (2003).
49 A theme of John H. Langbein, Rise of the Management Trust, 143 TR. & EST. MAG.,
Oct. 2004, at 52, 52-56.
50 As allowed, for example, under UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502, 7C U.L.A. 523.
51 See cases cited supra note 8.
52 See cases cited supra note 8.
51 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1168.
14 By contrast, the law of charitable trusts does impose objective standards of public
benefit on attempted charitable trusts. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(a), 7C U.L.A.
485; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) (replicating, in significant part, the
Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4). In Westminster Bank v. Pinion (In re
Pinion), [1965] 1 Ch. 85 (App. Ct. 1964) (Eng.), expert evidence was taken regarding the
artistic and cultural merit of a purported museum that the settlor undertook to found as a
charitable trust. Id. at 89-92. The court refused to enforce the trust, Lord Justice Harman
saying that he could "conceive of no useful object to be served in foisting upon the public
this mass of junk. It has neither public utility nor educative value." Id. at 104.
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trust terms manifestly harmful to the beneficiary. In the case of the Rembrandt
transferred in trust for Barbara as beneficiary with instructions to the trustee to
bum the Rembrandt, the reason that the court will not enforce the term is that,
as a matter of objective rationality, the term is manifestly not to her benefit.
What the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code have done
in articulating the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard is simply to clarify that
long implicit principle.
D. Mandatory Law55
1. UTC Section 105(b)
The rule against capricious purposes is one of a number of rules of trust law
that are mandatory, that is, not subject to variation or countermand by the
settlor. The UTC contains a menu-type provision, section 105(b), which
collects cross-references to the various mandatory rules found in the Code.
56
Cooper is seriously misleading in contending that this provision
"fundamentally departs from prior law by establishing fourteen 'mandatory
rules' that a trust settlor cannot waive. '57 Section 105(b) is indeed innovative
as a matter of organization or display, by collecting these cross-references in a
single place, 58 but apart from some reforms in the details of disclosure law,
59
the mandatory rules scheduled in section 105(b) are old hat. For example, the
UTC forbids the settlor from establishing a trust for illegal purposes, 60 or from
interfering with the court's power to require a bond. 61 Equally longstanding
are the mandatory rules identified in section 105(b) that forbid the settlor to
countermand the trustee's duty to act in good faith, 62 or the Code's limits on
51 I have suggested that the mandatory rules of trust law can be categorized as being of
two sorts: (1) anti-dead-hand rules that defeat the settlor's intent; and (2) intent-
implementing rules designed to protect the settlor as well as the beneficiaries from
misunderstanding or imposition. See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1105-
06, 1119-27.
56 UNIF. TRUST CODE §105(b), 7C U.L.A. 428-29.
17 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1173 (citation omitted).
58 The UTC follows the model of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b) (1997), 6,
pt.1 U.L.A. 73-74 (2001), in collecting and cross-referring in a single section to all the
mandatory provisions of a comprehensive statute that deals prevailingly with default law.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b), 7C U.L.A. 428-29.
59 UNIF. TRUST CODE §105(b)(8), 7C U.L.A. 428; id. § 813(a), 7C U.L.A. 609.
60 Id. §105(b)(3), 7C U.L.A. 428; id. § 404, 7C U.L.A. 484.
61 Id. §105(b)(6), 7C U.L.A. 428; id. § 702, 7C U.L.A. 563-64.
62 Id. §105(b)(2), 7C U.L.A. 428; id. § 801, 7C U.L.A. 587.
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exculpation clauses,63 or the requirements for trust creation, 64 or the statute of
limitations. 65 These rules do not "fundamentally depart[] from prior law. '66
2. Default Law
Among the requirements for trust creation - mandatory under the UTC and
long before - is the principle that "[a] trust is created only if ... the trustee has
duties to perform. '67  This principle, which overlaps the benefit-the-
beneficiaries standard, sets outer limits on the power of a settlor to
countermand even those rules of trust law that are default rules, notably the
law of fiduciary administration. The two core rules of trust fiduciary law - the
duty of loyalty (to administer the trust solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries) 68 and the duty of prudent administration (the care norm, which
requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution) 69 - are default
rules.70  Yet although the settlor can alter these rules, the settlor cannot
eliminate them. A trust term providing that the trustee owes no duty of loyalty
would leave the interests of the beneficiaries unprotected against a trustee who
set out to loot the trust. Such a term would violate both the principle that
fiduciary duties may not be entirely eliminated, 71 and the rule against
capricious purposes, that is, in UTC parlance, the rule that a trust and its terms
must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 72 Trust law's mandatory rule 73
limiting the extent of exculpation clauses74 reinforces this principle by striking
any trust term that "relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust
63 Id. §105(b)(10), 7C U.L.A. 428; id. § 1008, 7C U.L.A. 654.
64 Id. §105(b)(1), 7C U.L.A. 428; id. § 402, 7C U.L.A. 481.
65 Id. §105(b)(12), 7C U.L.A. 428-29.
66 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1173. For discussion of earlier trust law on many of these
rules, see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) cmt., 7C U.L.A. 429-32.
67 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(4), 7C U.L.A. 481; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
68 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a), 7C U.L.A. 588; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 78 (2007).
69 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804, 7C U.L.A. 601 ("A trustee shall administer the trust as a
prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and
other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise
reasonable care, skill, and caution."); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(1)-(2)
(2007).
7o See UNIF. TRUST CODE §105(a), 7C U.L.A. 428 (providing that all rules except those
made mandatory under § 105(b) are default rules); infra, text at notes 121-126.
71 See supra note 67.
72 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404, 7C U.L.A. 484.
" Id. § 105(b)(10), 7C U.L.A. 428.
74 Id. § 1008, 7C U.L.A. 654.
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committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust
or the interests of the beneficiaries. '7 5
Similarly, although the prudence norm is a default rule that the settlor "may
modify or relax," 76 the Restatement (Third) of Trusts emphasizes that "trust
terms may not altogether dispense with the fundamental requirement that
trustees not behave recklessly but act in good faith, with some suitable degree
of care, and in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the trust and
the interests of the beneficiaries. ' 77
These limits on settlor autonomy in the realm of default law have virtually
no effect in routine trust practice, because it is the rare settlor so perverse as to
attempt to alter the default rules in a manner so harmful to the trust's
beneficiaries. The typical settlor strains to benefit the beneficiaries, not harm
them. But when such a case arises, trust law protects the beneficiaries. The
official comment to the Uniform Trust Code plainly states that Code rules that
would otherwise be default law, may not be "overriden" when doing so would
conflict with "the trustee's fundamental obligation to act in good faith, in
accordance with the purposes of the trust, and for the benefit of the
beneficiaries. ' 78  A trust term exonerating recklessness or bad faith is
unenforceable for the same reason that the term directing the burning of the
Rembrandt is unenforceable. Trust law's deference to the settlor's direction
presupposes and presumes that the direction is beneficiary-regarding, which it
virtually always is. But if trust beneficiaries (or trustees acting on behalf of
trust beneficiaries) can carry the burden of showing that a trust term is contrary
to the interests of the beneficiaries, the otherwise default character of the rule
in question is no defense. The relatively few rules of mandatory law merely
set outer limits against trust terms so harmful that they would undermine
fiduciary obligation.
II. INVESTMENT DIRECTIONS
Because trust investing is a branch of fiduciary administration, trust
investment law reflects the twin principles discussed above: (1) routine
deference to settlor direction, subject, however, to (2) outer limits against
terms harmful to the interests of the beneficiaries. 79 In my 2004 article, I
suggested that the greater clarity of the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard (by
comparison with the older formulation in the rule against capricious purposes)
would help the courts respond appropriately to those rare cases in which a
75 Id. § 1008(a)(l), 7C U.L.A. 654. The rule is longstanding; the Code's version follows
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(2) cmt. d. (2007); see also id. § 29(c) cmt. m.
(2003) ("[A] trust provision may not be enforced if to do so would undermine proper
administration of the trust.").
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(2) cmt. d. (2007).
78 UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 8 general cmt., 7C U.L.A. 587.
71 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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settlor attempted to impose manifestly harmful investment directions. 80 By
contrast, Cooper's 2008 article contends that trust law should "provide no
aid"8 1 in such cases.
I offered two examples of investment folly on the part of a trust settlor that,
under the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard, should be struck.82  For
convenience, I shall refer to these examples as the Enron Case and the IBM
Case. The Enron Case concerned "a modest trust fund for the support of [the
settlor's] otherwise destitute widow and orphans"; the settlor required the fund
to be invested entirely in shares of the bankrupt Enron Corporation.8 3 The
settlor left an account of his thinking, in which he explained that he thought
that the shares were undervalued and had "the potential to increase greatly in
value."8 4  Such an instruction involves two fundamental blunders from the
standpoint of trust default law. Following the settlor's direction would subject
the portfolio to excessive risk relative to the risk tolerance of the trust's
extremely needy beneficiaries and contrary to the trustee's duty to pursue an
"investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the
trust. ' 85 Furthermore, by concentrating the portfolio in a single issue, this
program would subject the portfolio to the risk of massive underdiversification,
contrary to the trustee's duty to diversify trust investments.8 6 Accordingly, I
concluded: "No court would enforce such a direction, even though the
principles of trust investment law with which the direction conflicts (especially
the duty to diversify trust investments and, more generally, the duty of prudent
investing) are default rules that the settlor may waive. '8 7  Because the
"underdiversification and volatility levels would be so contrary to the risk-and-
return profile of the beneficiaries[,] ... the direction could not satisfy an
objective standard of benefit under the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. '8 8 Like
the direction to burn the Rembrandt, the investment direction in the Enron
Case is so capricious - that is, so objectively harmful to the interests of the
beneficiaries - that no court would enforce it. Revealingly, Cooper's 2008
critique of my article is wholly silent about the Enron Case. Despite Cooper's
claim that trust law should "provide no aid in cases where a settlor
intentionally and thoughtfully impaired beneficiaries' economic rights," 89
80 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1111-17.
81 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1166.
82 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1111-15.
83 Id. at 1111.
84 Id.
85 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b) (1994), 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006).
86 See id. § 3, 7B U.L.A. 29 ("A trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless
the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the
trust are better served without diversifying.").
87 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1111-12 (citations omitted).
88 Id. at 1112.
89 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1166.
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Cooper makes no effort to defend the objectively stupid investment provision
in the Enron Case.
My second example of an investment direction meriting judicial
intervention, the IBM Case,90 is what has attracted Cooper's ire. I supposed a
situation in which the settlor, a long-time employee of IBM, died, leaving in
trust as his only substantial asset a block of IBM stock. 91 The trust contained a
term forbidding the trustee from selling the shares.92 I noted that "because the
settlor's death result[ed] in a stepped-up basis" for tax purposes, the IBM
shares could be sold without tax cost.93 I posited further that the settlor left a
letter explaining his decision to impose this trust term, in which he said: "I
worked for IBM for 35 years, they were wonderful to me, they helped me buy
the stock, and the stock zoomed in value throughout my career. You just
cannot do better." 94 The main difference between the Enron Case and the IBM
Case is that the shares of bankrupt Enron are far riskier than those of the blue
chip IBM. What the two cases share is that each settlor has mandated massive
underdiversification in circumstances in which there is no offsetting
justification of merit. I explain below why such underdiversification has come
to be understood as inflicting "uncompensated risk," and why in consequence
such a trust term should be treated as capricious, hence unenforceable under
the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard.95
Cooper defends the trust term in the IBM case, reasoning that "[t]he settlor's
prohibition on the sale of IBM stock meets the traditional standard for
enforceability: it is neither illegal, immoral, nor against public policy. It is
merely foolish. '96 This argument is quite wrong: When foolishness becomes
seriously value-impairing to trust beneficiaries, it does not "meet the traditional
standard for enforceability." Rather, foolishness, which is a synonym for
capriciousness, is unenforceable for the same reason as the trust term to bum
the Rembrandt.
A. The Duty to Diversify Trust Investments
In the 1990s, the prudence norm of trust investment law underwent revision
in response to major changes in the investment practices of fiduciary
90 Posited initially in Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 663-65; further
developed in Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1111-13.
" Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 664; see also Langbein, Mandatory Rules,
supra note 14, at 1112-13.
92 Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 664; see also Langbein, Mandatory Rules,
supra note 14, at 1112-13.
13 Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 664; see also Langbein, Mandatory Rules,
supra note 14, at 1112-13.
14 Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 664; see also Langbein, Mandatory Rules,
supra note 14, at 1112-13.
9 See infra Part II.A.1.
96 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1175.
2010]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
investors. 97 The changed investment landscape resulted from empirical and
theoretical advances in the understanding of securities markets and portfolio
construction, a body of knowledge now commonly called Modem Portfolio
Theory ("MPT"). 98 Thus far, six Nobel Prizes in economics have been
awarded for the research underlying MPT.99
1. Why Diversification Matters
Two discoveries have been among the central findings of MPT: (1) the
difficulty that an investor faces in attempting to outperform the broad market
averages; I00 and (2) the large and essentially costless gains to be had from
diversifying a portfolio across many different asset classes, and across many
different issuers within an asset class. 01 MPT divides the risk of securities
ownership into compensated and uncompensated risk.102 For example, the
investor who buys bonds issued by weaker issuers (so called junk bonds)
assumes greater risk of default than the investor who only buys Treasuries.
The junk bonds pay higher interest rates, compensating the investor for bearing
the greater risk. But no one pays the investor for concentrating a portfolio in
too small a range of asset classes or issuers. Thus, underdiversification causes
the portfolio to bear uncompensated risk, risk that could be largely eliminated
by spreading the investments across a wider range of asset classes and
issues. 10 3 Discussing the IBM Case in my 2004 article, I gave examples of the
dangers of underdiversification:
Even a blue chip can suffer catastrophic and wholly unpredictable
losses - as happened, for example, to the shares of the Union Carbide
Company in the wake of the 1984 Bhopal disaster or to Texaco, then
independent and one of the major international oil companies, when a
97 I have reviewed these developments in Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at
1113, and more extensively in Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 642, 645-49. For
earlier accounts, see generally BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986); JAMES H. LORIE & MARY T. HAMILTON, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (1973); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market
Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1.
98 Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 642. For a lawyers' guide, see generally
JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY (2d ed. 1998).
9 Franco Modigliani (1985), Harry M. Markowitz (1990), Merton H. Miller (1990),
William F. Sharpe (1990), Robert C. Merton (1997), and Myron S. Scholes (1997). See All
Laureates in Economic Sciences, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/econoics/laureates
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
1o Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 14, at 655-58.
101 Id. at 646-49.
102 Id. at 648.
103 Id. Empirical research indicates that the uncompensated risk of underdiversification
within an equity portfolio can be largely eliminated in a carefully constructed portfolio of
approximately twenty different issues. RICHARD A. BREALY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 162 (8th ed. 2006).
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fluke lawsuit forced it into bankruptcy in 1987. Such changes of fortune
can occur more slowly, but be equally catastrophic for a trust fund that is
locked into a declining company. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s
the mass merchant Kmart was a revered blue chip; no one could have
predicted that the success of an upstart Arkansas retailer called Wal-Mart
would ultimately send Kmart into bankruptcy in the year 2002.... We
have lately seen accounting frauds reduce huge firms such as Enron and
WorldCom to bankruptcy, frauds that sophisticated investment
professionals failed to detect until the harm was done.
Because it is so hard to foresee the next Bhopal or WorldCom, the
prudent fiduciary investor diversifies so broadly that if catastrophe befalls
one of the holdings in the portfolio, the loss will be lessened (and often
somewhat offset by the performance of other portfolio companies,
because competitors commonly prosper when a rival falters).1 04
Modem Portfolio Theory isolates three distinct components of the risk of
owning any security: market risk, industry risk, and firm risk. 10 5 "Market risk
is common to all securities," and cannot therefore be diversified away; "it
reflects general economic and political conditions," 10 6 such as the credit market
collapse of 2008-2009. "Industry risk, by contrast, is specific to the firms in a
particular industry or an industry grouping." 10 7 Firm risk involves factors that
affect only a particular firm, such as the impact of the Bhopal disaster on
shares of Union Carbide. 10 8
The capital market investigators have... been able to compute the
approximate weight of [these] three elements that comprise the risk of
securities ownership. In round numbers, market risk has been reckoned at
30 percent; the risk of industry and other groupings at 50 percent; and
firm risk at 20 percent. These numbers underlie the intense [concern]
with diversification as the means of reducing the risk of investing. 109
Industry risk and firm risk, constituting some seventy percent of the risk of
securities ownership, can be largely eliminated through diversification, and
essentially without cost.'1 0
"o4 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1113-14 (citations omitted).




109 Id. at 647-48 (citing R.A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM
COMMON STOCKS 117 (2d ed. 1983)). "Brealey's actual numbers are 31% market risk; 12%
industry risk; 37% other groupings; and 20% firm risk. The passage in the text consolidates
industry and other groupings and rounds it to 50%." Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note
14, at 647, n.47.
110 Id. at 647-48.
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2. The Trust Law Duty
In response to the lessons of MPT, the duty to diversify trust investments
has been intensified, both in revisions to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
finalized in 1992,111 and in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 1994
("UPIA"). 112 The UPIA is now in force in all but a few states. 113 The Uniform
Trust Code of 2000 incorporates the UPIA by reference. 1 4 Section 3 of the
UPIA provides: "A trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless
the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the
purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying."'" 5 Jurisdictions
that had resisted the duty to diversify in prior law, notably New York 1 6 and
Pennsylvania, 117 capitulated and enacted versions of the uniform act. 118
Like the rest of trust investment law, the duty to diversify is a default rule.
The UPIA permits a trustee to decide not to diversify, but only for good reason
("special circumstances" in which "the purposes of the trust are better
... See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b) (1992) (integrating the requirement of
diversification into the definition of prudent investing). This provision has now been
recodified without change as RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(b) (2007). For the
reporter's discussion of the reforms, see generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment
Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 407 (1992).
112 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 (1994), 7B U.L.A. 29 (2006).
113 The Act is in force in forty-five states and the District of Columbia. Id. tbl., 7B
U.L.A. 1-2 (2009 Supp.). The remaining states have nonuniform versions. See Max M.
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Chance
Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J. L. & EcON. 681, 686 & n.13, 708-09 tbl.A1 (2007). The
Act made a number of reforms in addition to. strengthening the duty to diversify. See UNIF.
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 3; John H. Langbein, The New
American Trust-Investment Act, 8 TR. L. INT'L 123, 123-24 (1994). A few states have
nonuniform provisions weakening the duty to diversify. E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, §
3303(a) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:9-901(b) (2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7204-7205 (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-8 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
114 The Code supplies an otherwise blank Article 9, whose prefatory comment advises
enacting jurisdictions on how to recodify the UPIA as UTC Article 9. UNIF. TRUST CODE
art. 9 general cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 642 (2006).
115 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 29. Section 4 of the Act, dealing with
the duties of a trustee receiving assets at the inception of a trusteeship, allows "a reasonable
time . . . [to] review the trust assets and make and implement decisions concerning the
retention and disposition of assets, in order to bring the trust portfolio into compliance." Id.
§ 4, 7B U.L.A. 33.
116 See In re Adriance's Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 173, 181 (Sur. Ct. 1932). For the modem
position in New York, enforcing the duty to diversify, see In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d
332, 336 (N.Y. 1997).
117 See In re Saeger's Estate, 16 A.2d 19, 21-22 (1940).
I18 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(C) (McKinney 2008 & Supp.
2009); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7204-7205.
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served"). 119  The official comment to the Act identifies two such
circumstances: (1) the case in which the tax advantages "may outweigh the
advantages of diversifying the holding"; and (2) some cases in which a trust
"retain[s] a family business."' 120
3. The Relationship of Mandatory and Default Law
Cooper bases his argument for deference to the settlor's direction in the
IBM case on an extreme textualist interpretation of the default character of the
duty to diversify. 121 Emphasizing that "the UPIA is a pure default statute," 22
Cooper reasons that because the UPIA does not repeat the UTC's benefit-the-
beneficiaries requirement, the UPIA should be read by implication to conflict
with and exclude that rule.123 Cooper's mistake is to treat a specialized statute,
such as the UPIA, as though it were meant to operate in isolation from the rest
of trust law. The UPIA addresses investment issues; it does not restate the
whole of trust law. Indeed, the UPIA does not restate any of the longstanding
rules of mandatory law, such as the rule against illegal purposes. For the same
reason that the UPIA's default rules of investment practice do not, by
implication, validate trust terms directing a trustee to invest in a bordello or in
narcotics trafficking, 124 Cooper is wrong to claim that the UPIA, by
implication, repeals or is irreconcilable with the rule against capricious
purposes (now formulated as the benefit-the-beneficiaries requirement) as that
rules applies to investment directions. The UPIA does not speak to or bear on
the scope of the mandatory rules found in the UTC or in the trust law of non-
UTC jurisdictions.
The duty to diversify remains default law, which the UPIA authorizes the
settlor to abridge in those "special circumstances, [in which] the purposes of
the trust are better served without diversifying."' 125  There is always a
presumption that the donor who establishes a trust is acting for the benefit of
the beneficiaries, but that presumption can be overcome in the rare case in
which evidence establishes that a trust term will harm the interests of the
beneficiaries. What has changed in recent decades is the growing
"9 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 29.
120 Id. § 3 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 29.
21 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1180-81.
122 Id. (citing UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1(b), 7B U.L.A. 15-16). Section l(b)
provides that "[t]he prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded, restricted,
eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust." UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT
§ 1(b), 7B U.L.A. 15-16.
123 By "completely overrid[ing] the default posture of the UPIA," the benefit-the-
beneficiaries rule "convert[s] the previously default duty to diversify into a mandatory one
that ... the settlor cannot abrogate." Cooper, supra note 13, at 1180-8 1.
124 For the rule against illegal trust purposes, see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404, 7C U.L.A.
484 (2006).
125 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 29.
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understanding of the extent to which diversification is beneficial and costless
("the only free lunch in economics"126), and these factors bear on the question
of whether a trust term is seriously harmful.
In the IBM Case, in which there is a direction not to diversify a trust fund
concentrated entirely in the shares of a single, liquid, widely-held security, no
offsetting benefit arises from the failure to diversify. 127 The settlor directed the
trust to bear the uncompensated risk intrinsic to underdiversification without
compensating advantage. 28 Attempting to defend that direction, Cooper asks
us to imagine a variant in which the settlor justifies the direction by explaining,
"I worked for IBM for thirty-five years and I believe that company is poised to
enter a period of unprecedented growth. The market fundamentally
misperceives the company's business prospects and its stock is grossly
undervalued."' 129 According to Cooper, this direction must now be followed,
because the settlor has "offerfed] a logical rationale for why diversification
would not maximize his beneficiaries' wealth."' 30 But Cooper supplies no
basis for his assertion that this recital constitutes "a logical rationale."' 131 In
truth, this supposed "rationale" is quite illogical. It presupposes that a now-
deceased former employee of IBM (an immense, publicly-traded company,
which is followed by dozens of professional securities analysts, and which
operates in rapidly changing technology-based fields) possesses material
information or insight of enduring value that the securities markets have
mispriced. Indeed, Cooper asserts that this improbable recital evidences the
settlor's "understanding of financial markets and investment strategy.' 32 The
more likely inference, based on what is now known about the difficulty of
identifying mispriced securities133 and the enormous advantages of
diversification, is that the settlor's recital is the product not of his
"understanding of financial markets and investment strategy," but rather of his
sentimental affection for bygone days. The settlor's well-intentioned but
primitive views on investment matters do not justify investment directions that
are otherwise objectively foolish by the standards of the field. The question
whether an investment direction is capricious is intrinsically objective. Sincere
belief in folly does not make folly any less foolish.
126 This is an oft-repeated turn of phrase that I have not been able to trace to its source.
See, e.g., Aaron Pressman, Your Post Sub-Prime Portfolio, Bus. WK., July 14, 2008, at 48.
127 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1112-13; Langbein, Trust
Investing, supra note 14, at 664.
128 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1112-13; Langbein, Trust
Investing, supra note 14, at 664.




133 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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4. When Other Factors Outweigh Diversificiation
The duty to diversify has remained a default rule in the prudent investor
reforms, because, despite the advantages of diversification, there are various
circumstances in which a prudent fiduciary may conclude that other
considerations outweigh diversification. I pointed to several such examples in
my 2004 article, including the case in which the tax cost of diversifying low
basis assets is thought too high. 134 I also raised the case in which "the trust in
question is but one of many for the same beneficiaries, or when the trust
otherwise represents only a small portion of the total wealth available to the
beneficiaries," so that "the trustee may appropriately take into account the
beneficiaries' other trust and nontrust resources in deciding whether and how
to diversify the trust." 135 Inexplicably, Cooper has chosen to charge me with
disregarding this conventional point: He contends that restricting the settlor's
power to impose foolish directions against diversification would prevent such
standard one-asset trust arrangements as life insurance trusts, 136 which are
commonly part of larger estate planning arrangements. In truth, there need be
nothing in tension with the duty to diversify when a single-asset trust is
deployed as part of a suitably diversified, multi-asset estate plan. Of course,
life insurance is commonly held for purposes remote from investment, such as
providing liquidity for survivors during estate administration and funding
estate taxes.
Another characteristic circumstance also mentioned in my 2004 article, in
which other values often overcome underdiversification is the situation in
which trust assets are not being held for investment or are being held only
partially for investment.
Such "programmatic" investing is common in certain kinds of
charitable trusts - for example, in a trust that holds land as a bird
sanctuary or nature preserve. There are analogues to programmatic
investing in personal trusts, as when the settlor directs that the family
134 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1114 & n.50. There are strategies
involving the use of risk collars and derivatives in order to reduce the risk of
underdiversification in such cases. E.g., George Crawford, A Fiduciary Duty to Use
Derivatives?, I STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 307, 315-16, 322, 331-32 (1995). There are also
many circumstances in which a prudent fiduciary will decide that paying taxes is wiser than
bearing the underdiversification risk. Oddly, Cooper points to a tax-saving technique, the
grantor retained annuity trust ("GRAT"), as being imperiled by restraints on foolish settlor
directions against underdiversification. Cooper, supra note 13, at 1198-1201. But there is a
world of difference between the uncompensated risk resulting from the underdiversification
in the IBM Case, and the compensated risk found in the GRAT.
35 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1114 & n.49. The UPIA's prudent
investor factors "include[] attention to 'other resources of the beneficiaries' among the
'circumstances that a trustee shall consider in investing and managing trust assets."' Id.
(quoting UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(c)(6) (1994), 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006)).
136 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1196-98.
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residence be retained as a home for the widow or that vacation property
be held for the recreational use of family members. 37
5. Family Enterprises
By comparison with the Enron Case or the IBM Case, in which the settlor's
direction to hold a completely underdiversified portfolio is indefensible, cases
involving a direction to retain a family enterprise present more varied
circumstances. I have pointed to cases in which such directions to retain may
indeed be beneficiary-regarding:
[A] family firm sometimes occupies a market niche that produces
returns superior to those readily available to fiduciaries in the investment
markets. There are circumstances in which a family firm that would not
realize much if sold or liquidated can continue to be a profitable source of
employment and income for family members. Sometimes what motivates
the settlor's direction to retain is the belief that operating the family firm
can be the source of influence, prestige, and perquisites for family
members that may outweigh the superior expected investment returns of a
diversified portfolio. We see such thinking in the strategies that have
been used to perpetuate family control of such prominent institutions as
the New York Times and the Ford Motor Company, as well as many
smaller and less storied firms. 138
There are, however, much more problematic circumstances in which a
settlor insists on retaining a family firm that is failing, or that needs capital or
managerial resources beyond the family's ability to provide. In such
circumstances, the settlor's direction to retain a family firm can be as
capricious as the direction to build statues of himself.139 Cooper, however,
refuses to distinguish between sound and perverse directions in such cases -
between cases in which a direction to retain does or does not violate the
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. Indeed, he endorses the validity of the trust of a
hypothetical settlor who admitted that self-glorification motivated his direction
to retain a family business ("I built this business over thirty-five years and it
137 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1114-15. For drafting precepts in such
cases, see generally Wendy S. Goffe, Keeping the Cabin in the Family: A Guide to Joint
Ownership and Use, 31 ACTEC J. 89 (2005) (American College of Trust & Estate
Counsel). "Among circumstances that a trustee shall consider in investing and managing
trust assets ... [is] an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of
the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries." UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §2(c)(8), 7B
U.L.A. 20.
138 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 14, at 1115-16 (citations omitted). For a
recent instance in which a court sustained the prudence of a trustee's decision to retain close
corporation shares after carefully considering alternatives, see In re Hyde, 845 N.Y.S.2d
833, 838 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
'19 See cases cited supra note 8.
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has become a great source of pride."). 140 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule
requires that a prudent trustee who is directed by trust terms to retain a
troubled family enterprise should investigate whether doing so would be
sufficiently inimical to the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust that the
trustee should petition the court for instruction.
141
6. Imaginary Horribles
Cooper's article tails off with a variety of arguments having the common
thread that the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard risks affecting the behavior of
large numbers of beneficiaries, settlors, and trust drafters. These claims are
highly suspect for the simple reason that most trust settlors are too wise to
want to impose such terms, and most trust lawyers are wise and effective
enough to discourage the remaining few.
Among Cooper's claims of this sort is the old standby warning about
opening the floodgates of litigation. 142 Cooper cautions that subjecting settlor
directions to the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard would "foster significant
fiduciary litigation."' 143  This prediction is highly improbable. Settlor
directions mandating underdiversification occur quite rarely, because, as
mentioned, most settlors and trust counsel know better. Moreover, the benefit-
the-beneficiaries rule does nothing more than clarify the old rule against
capricious purposes, which has produced only a tiny case law.144
Another such claim is the argument that the benefit-the-beneficiaries
standard, which is meant to prevent foolishness at the outer limits of trust
practice, will so restrict the discretion of trust investors that they will all be
forced to invest alike. 145 This claim is improbable not only because such
settlor directives occur with great rarity, but also because the claim runs
counter to one of the central achievements of the prudent investor reforms.
140 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1175.
141 Most such cases can be resolved under the deviation doctrine, on the basis that
changed circumstances justify departure from the trust terms. Under the doctrine, the court
may modify or authorize deviation from a trust provision "if because of circumstances not
anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation will further the purposes of the trust."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(l) (2003). "If a trustee knows or should know of'
the existence of such circumstances, "and of the potential of those circumstances to cause
substantial harm to the trust or its beneficiaries, the trustee has a duty to petition the court
for appropriate modification of or deviation from the terms of the trust." Id. § 66(2); see
also id. § 71 (2007) (providing that a trustee may apply for judicial instruction in case of
reasonable doubt).
142 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1184-85.
143 Id. at 1185.
4 Regarding the case law dealing with the rule against capricious purposes, see 2 ScoTr
& ASCHER, TRUSTS, supra note 8, § 9.3.13, at 516-18. For case law regarding other
mandatory rules, see id. §§ 9.2-9.3.12, at 471-516; id. § 9.3.14, at 518-20.
141 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1186-87.
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The UPIA emphasizes the importance of tailoring each trust portfolio to the
risk and return characteristics of that particular trust. 146
Cooper's unfounded assumption about the frequency of these rare cases
underlies various other speculative claims - that seeking to avoid the benefit-
the-beneficiaries requirement will cause trust settlors to select trustees "too
ignorant to understand"' 47 the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, induce settlors to
skew beneficiary designations towards more docile donees,148 or cause settlors
to go situs shopping for more permissive jurisdictions. 149  Because the
mandatory rules now codified in the UTC have been part of trust law for so
long, including the forerunner of the benefit-the-beneficiaries standard, Cooper
has a bit of explaining to do about why these litigation floodgates have yet to
feel the waves he predicts.
CONCLUSION
I have sounded four main themes in this Essay. First, the benefit-the-
beneficiaries rule found in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the UTC is
not the radical and worrisome innovation that Cooper paints it to be, but is in
fact a modest and helpful clarification of a longstanding and wholly benign
rule of trust law, the rule against capricious purposes. 150
Second, trust law strikes a balance between deferring to settlor's intent and
enforcing the minimum fiduciary obligations that inhere in the trust form. 15'
Trust law grants the settlor virtually unbounded freedom to select beneficiaries
and apportion beneficial shares, but it does not permit the settlor to destroy the
fiduciary obligation. One of the longstanding mandatory rules of trust creation
is that a trust must create enforceable duties. 152 Accordingly, "a settlor may
not so negate the responsibilities of a trustee that the trustee would no longer
be acting in a fiduciary capacity." 153 The mandatory rules of trust law reflect
both anti-dead-hand principles rooted in public policy, and principles such as
the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule that protect the equitable title of beneficiaries.
The mandatory rules set outer limits on settlor autonomy, requiring objective
standards of rationality in matters of trust administration, in contrast to the
settlor's complete and subjective dominion in selecting beneficiaries and
delimiting beneficial shares. The law of trust administration is default law, but
146 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b) (1994), 7B U.L.A. (2006) (establishing trustee's
duty to formulate "investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to
the trust").
147 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1202.
148 Id. at 1203.
141 Id. at 1204-05.
jso See supra Part L.A-C.
'5' See supra Part I.C-D.
152 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(4) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 481 (2006); accord
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
153 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(l) cmt., 7C U.L.A. 429.
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the rule against capricious purposes, now reformulated as the benefit-the-
beneficiaries standard, imposes an overriding requirement of objective benefit.
The settlor is rightly presumed to be acting in the interest of the beneficiaries,
and almost always is. But the crackpot settlor who insists on having the
Rembrandt burnt is not, and neither is the settlor who insists on inflicting the
uncompensated risk of a one-stock portfolio, be it Enron or IBM.
Third, the mandatory rules of the UTC do not "fundamentally depart[] from
prior law,"' 154 but constitute a codification, in some cases with light refinement,
of trust law's few but longstanding restrictions on settlor autonomy.155 Neither
the mandatory rules of the Code, nor the comparable rules of the common law
of trusts in non-Code jurisdictions, undermine the default character of the rules
of trust administration and trust investment. Rules of mandatory law, such as
the requirement that trust terms benefit the beneficiaries, merely set outer
limits against trust terms so harmful that they would otherwise undermine
fiduciary obligation. The settlor who is forbidden to direct the trustee to bum
the Rembrandt is still allowed to impose any investment or administrative
regime that does not offend outer limits of rationality.
Finally, claims about the woeful systemic consequences of enforcing the
benefit-the-beneficiaries requirement are conjectural and unsound.156 In
quantitative terms, neither the rule against capricious purposes, nor its
reformulation as the benefit-the-beneficiaries requirement, have in the past or
will in the future play any serious role in trust practice, because the vast
preponderance of trust settlors and their counsel are far too sensible to come
anywhere near violating the rule.
151 Cooper, supra note 13, at 1173.
151 See supra Part I.D.
156 See supra Part II.
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